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We identify the causal effect of compulsory military service on conscripts’ subsequent labor-
market outcomes by exploiting the regression-discontinuity design of the military draft in 
Germany during the 1950s. Unbiased estimates of the effect of military service on lifetime 
earnings, wages, and employment are obtained by comparing men born before July 1, 1937 
(the “White Cohort”) who were exempted from compulsory military service to men who were 
born on or shortly after this threshold date and hence faced a positive probability of being 
drafted. We find that the putative earnings advantage and wage premium of those who 
served in the armed forces vanish when selection effects are taken into account. 
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The recruitment of military personnel varies considerably across countries and over
time. While a number of countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States,
has relied and continues to rely on all-volunteer forces, most European countries pur-
sued a policy of compulsory military service (CMS). However, since the end of the
Cold War, many European countries recently changed towards all-volunteer forces
(e.g., France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and many Eastern European countries) or are plan-
ning to do so in the near future (e.g., Albania, Serbia, Sweden, and Ukraine). Yet many
European countries are not planning to abandon the military draft (e.g., Austria, Den-
mark, Switzerland, Germany, and Greece) despite on-going discussions in most of
these countries to do so.
Many economic arguments suggest that a professional army should be preferred
because of structural inefﬁciencies and potential long-run costs that may arise in a
draft system. Until recently, much less attention has been put on the long-run effects
of CMS for the conscripts, both in the economic literature and the public discussion.1
Draftees have to serve in a period of their life that is usually characterized by human
capital investments, which is disrupted by the military service. They may further suf-
fer from a deterioration of their human capital stock during service. Even though the
long-run effects of CMS may be even more important than the structural inefﬁciencies,
empirical evidence on these long-run effects is rather scarce.
This paper emphasizes the long-run effects of conscription by analyzing the ef-
fects of CMS on subsequent labor market outcomes in Germany. However, identifying
these effects is problematic for several reasons. Whether someone is drafted for CMS
is partially determined by factors which are directly related to labor-market outcomes,
such as health status. Access to information on characteristics which determine draft
status would enable the researcher to identify the causal effects of military service by
1See Lau, Poutvaara and Wagener [2004] and Keller, Poutvaara and Wagener [2008] for a recent
analysis of the dynamic costs of the draft.
2correcting for selection bias. However, these variables are usually not available to the
researcher.
In reaction to such deﬁciencies, previous studies relied on instrumental-variable
(IV) estimates [Angrist 1990; Angrist and Krueger 1994; Imbens and van der Klaauw
1995]. These efforts found either a negative effect or no effect of military service on
subsequent earnings. For instance, using the year of birth as an instrument for the
probability to be drafted for the Vietnam War, Angrist [1990] estimated that ten years
after the war, white veterans realized approximately 15 percent lower annual wages
than non-veterans. However, the wage differentials between non-white veterans and
non-veterans were not statistically signiﬁcant. Based on IV estimates that utilize the
relationship between the date of birth and veteran status, Angrist and Krueger [1994]
found that World War II veterans earn the same as non-veterans, if not less. Imbens
and van der Klaauw [1995] used variations in the probability to be drafted for CMS
across birth cohorts to instrument for military service. They show that ten years after
CMS in the Netherlands, those who served earn on average 5 percent less than those
who did not serve.
In our analysis, we complement traditional estimation methods with a regression-
discontinuity (RD) approach to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of CMS on
subsequent labor-market outcomes.2 The RD design used here is based on a disconti-
nuity in the probability to be drafted for CMS across birth cohorts in Germany. When
creating the new armed forces in the second half of the ﬁfties, all men born before July
1, 1937 were exempted from CMS. On the other hand, men born on July 1, 1937 and
after faced a positive probability of being drafted. Based on this rule, we use obser-
2The RD approach was introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell [1960]. It has recently been
used, for example, by van der Klaauw [2002] to investigate the effects of ﬁnancial aid on college en-
rollment, by Black [1999] to evaluate the effect of elementary-school quality on housing prices, and by
Angrist and Lavy [1999] to identify the effect of class size on schooling attainment. Furthermore, Hahn,
Todd and van der Klaauw [1999] analyze the effect of an anti-discrimination law on minority employ-
ment in small US ﬁrms, DiNardo and Lee [2004] estimate the effect of unionization on establishment
closure and wages, and Lee [2008] analyzes whether political incumbency provides an advantage in
elections to public ofﬁce. Closest in objective to our paper is the study by Buonanno [2006] who looks
at the long-term effects of conscription on earnings and educational attainment in the UK.
3vations on the so-called “White Cohort” (Weißer Jahrgang in German, i.e., men who
neither served during World War II nor were required to perform CMS) as a control
group.3
Cross-sectional comparisons of the labor-market outcomes for men who served in
the Bundeswehr with those who did not indicate that those men who served appar-
ently enjoy a wage premium. This premium, together with the fact that they remain
employed longer than those who did not enter the armed forces, translate to a lifetime
earnings advantage of about 17 percent. However, we ﬁnd that the superior labor-
market performance of the draftees is merely the result of the non-random selection
mechanism used at that time to admit conscripts. The wage, employment, and earn-
ings differentials vanish when we control for selection bias.
2 Compulsory Military Service in Germany
The membership of West Germany in NATO required the creation of the Bundeswehr
with a projected maximum strength of around 500,000 soldiers. The West German
parliament decided at this time that the Bundeswehr should be composed largely of
conscripted men. The corresponding law regulating the introduction of CMS passed
the parliament in July 1956. According to this law, all able-bodied men born after June
30, 1937 have to serve in the armed forces. The ﬁrst 10,000 conscripts entered in May
1957 and they had to serve for 12 months.4
3It is important to note that in the studies of Angrist [1990] and Angrist and Krueger [1994], the
samples include people who were actually in a war. Our sample excludes people who were in combat
duty. This might explain the negative impact of serving in the Vietnam War on the earnings of veterans.
However, updated estimates by Angrist and Chen [2008] using the same instrumental variable show
effects that are nearly zero in later periods of the life cycle.
4In 1962, the duration of CMS was extended to 18 months and has changed several times since
then. In West Germany, women were exempted from CMS. Women were allowed to work voluntarily
for the military only in medical professions. In January 2001, the law allowing women to enter combat
duty came into force. For conscientious objectors, the German constitution as well as the law on CMS
provides the opportunity to perform an alternative type of service. This alternative service mainly
comprises auxiliary activities in the health-care sector. In the birth cohorts relevant for the empirical
analysis, the fraction of conscientious objectors is small. The ﬁrst 340 conscientious objectors started
their service in April 1961. Until the 1970s, the annual number of conscientious objectors stayed at a
negligible level [Haberhauer and Maneval 2000].
4In principle, the regulations governing conscription are simple. All men of a par-
ticular birth cohort are called for medical and psychological evaluations around their
18th birthday. Based on these examinations, they are divided into three groups: (a)
those with good health are categorized as being ﬁt for service; (b) men with smaller
health problems are temporarily deferred from service; and (c) men with severe health
problems are immediately exempted from military service. Even if the medical and
psychological evaluations state that a person is ﬁt to serve, there are various other fac-
tors that can lead to an exemption from military service. First, volunteers to the police,
the Federal Border Guard, the Peace Corps, and disaster-control workers as well as
priests are exempted. Finally, those who have been sentenced to prison because of
high treason or the endangering of outer security are not drafted.
The existing economic literature on the individual effects of CMS in Germany con-
centrates on the implicit income tax placed on the conscripts. This tax equals the dif-
ference between the income that those who serve could earn in the civilian market
and the usually lower income from military service. Using aggregate data for 1995,
Schleicher [1996] calculates that the direct monthly opportunity costs of service for the
average German conscript are approximately e1,950. The total cost of compulsory
military and civil service resulting from this implicit tax amounts to more than 27 per-
cent of the ofﬁcial defense budget in 1995. Similar numbers are reported by Sch¨ afer
[2000].5 Because of the various exemptions from military service, this implicit income
tax is not equally distributed among the male population. Although these opportunity
costs and externalities are important, we do not aim to estimate them here. We instead
focus on the potential effects of CMS on labor-market outcomes after the service.
The long-term costs of CMS on subsequent labor-market outcomes could be ex-
pected to be numerically at least as important as the direct opportunity costs of ser-
vice, if not more. Usually, potential recruits are not immediately drafted after either
5In the US, the direct costs of military service received increasing attention already in the 1960s. See,
among others, Bailey and Cargill [1969], Davis and Palomba [1968], Fisher [1969], Hansen and Weisbrod
[1967], Oi [1967], and Spencer and Woroniak [1969].
5their health examinations or the end of their temporary exemptions. They will rarely
be able to foresee when exactly they will be called to serve. Due to this uncertainty,
it may be difﬁcult for them to ﬁnd permanent employment. They may be obliged
to accept casual employment and are more likely to be unemployed [Oi 1967]. This
tenuous labor-market status during the waiting period may have detrimental effects
on the human capital of potential recruits in terms of lower job training or occupation-
speciﬁcskills. Hence, itmayresultinrelativelylowerearningsandworseemployment
prospects even after military service. It has further been argued that conscripts suffer
from a deterioration of their human-capital stock during their time of service [Spencer
and Woroniak 1969]. Since the wages paid by the armed forces to the conscripts are in
most cases lower than their market wage, armed forces that rely on conscription usu-
ally suffer from an inefﬁciently low capital-labor ratio. This further suggests that the
armed forces have no incentive to use the human capital of conscripts in an efﬁcient
way and to allocate them to appropriate jobs within the military sector.
However, military service may also have positive effects on the human-capital
stock of the conscripts and hence enhance their labor-market performance. During
military service, conscripts may acquire soft skills such as working in a team and in
a strict hierarchical structure. These skills may be rewarded in the civilian labor mar-
ket. Furthermore, performing CMS may be used by potential employers as a signal
for good health status or a high sense of responsibility, resulting in positive statistical
discrimination in favor of those who served. This preferential treatment that former
conscripts could potentially receive in the labor market could translate into a wage
premium.
Overall, the long-term labor-market effects of CMS are not easily predictable. As
discussed above, there are convincing arguments on both sides such that the ultimate
effect is uncertain. However, any such effect—positve or negative—assumes that the
resulting differential performance in the labor market is caused by military service.
We contribute to the analysis by estimating the net effect with what we believe is a
6solid econometric identiﬁcation strategy that controls for the likely selection bias that
arises in conscription.
3 Regression-Discontinuity Design
Investigating the effects of CMS on subsequent labor-market outcomes presents a clas-
sical evaluation problem. Since men are either drafted or not drafted, we do not ob-
serve a single individual in both states. Consider any generic labor-market outcome
of interest, say, lifetime earnings. Suppose that this outcome is determined by the
equation:
Yi = ai + tMi + ei, (1)
where Yi denotes the lifetime earnings of individual i, Mi is the treatment indicator
that equals 1 if individual i performed CMS and 0 otherwise, and ei is a stochastic
disturbance term. Our parameter of interest is t  E[YijMi = 1]   E[YijMi = 0],
which is the earnings premium or penalty of serving in the Bundeswehr. If treatment
is non-random, simple OLS estimates of t will be biased since E[ejMi] 6= 0. Such a
selection bias in the estimate of t could occur, for example, because the health status of
an individual affects both the probability to be drafted for CMS and lifetime earnings
Yi. In the RD approach, additional information about discontinuities in the probability
to be selected into treatment P[Mi = 1jXi] is used to obtain consistent estimates of t.6
Apart from the treatment indicator Mi, let Wi be in indicator variable that equals 1
if a man was born at or after July 1, 1937 and 0 otherwise. One could thus distinguish
three groups: men born before July 1, 1937 (the White Cohort) who were altogether
exempted from military service (Mi = 0 and Wi = 0); men born at or after July 1,
1937 who could in principle be drafted for military service but who were exempted
due to one of the reasons described in the last section (Mi = 0, Wi = 1); and men
6We give a cursory treatment of RD designs here. For a more thorough discussion, including the
asymptotic behavior of these estimators, the interested reader is referred to the authoritative article of
Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw [2001].
7born at or after July 1, 1937 who were drafted for CMS (Mi = 1, Wi = 1). Hence, for
the full sample of individuals, the conditional probability of receiving treatment Mi is
known to be discontinuous at a threshold value B, i.e., the date of birth that separates
the White Cohort from the rest.
The literature on the RD approach typically differentiates between two types of
discontinuities [Trochim 1984]. The case where treatment Mi is known to depend on
Bi in a deterministic way is called the sharp design. If Mi depends on Bi in a stochastic
way, it is called the fuzzy design. Note that our case could be considered a mixture
of the sharp and fuzzy designs.7 Let B denote the threshold birthday of July 1, 1937.
We know that men born before B are exempted from military service, i.e., E[MijBi <
B] = 0, whereas the probability to be drafted for military service is a function of some
individual characteristics Xi, such as health status, for those born at or after B, i.e.,
E[MijBi  B] = f(Xi) + hi.
The RD approach makes use of the expectation that individuals who are just be-
low the threshold value B are similar in their observed and unobserved character-
istics to individuals who are just above B but for the probability of being selected
into treatment. Hence, the distribution of observed and unobserved characteristics
of individuals born just before July 1, 1937 will be arbitrarily close to the distribu-
tion of observed and unobserved characteristics of individuals born at or just after
this date, i.e., for individuals born near the cutoff point, it could be expected that
E[aijBi = B + D] = E[aijBi = B   D], where D denotes an arbitrarily small number.
Assuming that the unknown parameter h in E[MijBi] = f(Xi) + hi is an indepen-
dent assignment error, i.e., Cov(e,h) = 0, the treatment parameter t can be consis-
tently estimated by implementing the regression:
Yi = a + tMi + g(Bi) + ni, (2)
7Battistin and Rettore [2008] call this the “partially fuzzy design”.
8where g(Bi) is a control function that is continuous in B and represents a speciﬁcation
of E[ejBi]. However, if h is not independent of e given M, the estimate of t in Equa-
tion (1) is biased. The resulting selection bias depends on Cov(X,ejM) and may take
any sign [van der Klaauw 2002].
The literature on the RD approach suggests two solutions to this selection-bias
problem. Van der Klaauw [2002] proposes a two-step estimation procedure. Let
Wi = 1 if Bi > B and Wi = 0 otherwise. In the ﬁrst step, the propensity score is
estimated using
E[MijBi] = f(Bi) + dWi, (3)
where f(Bi) is some function of B that is continuous in B. In the second stage, Mi in
Equation (2) is replaced by the ﬁrst-stage estimates of E[MijBi]:
Yi = a + tE[MijBi] + g(Bi) + ni. (4)
If the functions for g(Bi) and f(Bi) are speciﬁed correctly, Equation (4) produces con-
sistent estimates of the treatment effect t. If g(Bi) and f(Bi) are modelled parametri-
cally using the same functional form, this two-stage procedure reduces to a standard
2SLS IV estimator, where Wi and f(Bi) are used as instruments (and are hence as-
sumed to be orthogonal to ni) [Wald 1940].
In our empirical analysis, we constrain f(Bi) to be equal to g(Bi) and then proceed
to estimate the system of Equations (3) and (4) twice: (a) using a higher-order polyno-
mial and (b) a restricted cubic spline of the difference in days of an individual’s date of
birth Bi and the threshold date B. We further use three quarter-of-birth dummies and
two dummies representing the educational attainment of an individual. An advan-
tage of this two-step approach is that the identiﬁcation of t uses all observations over
B. One limitation is that it is more fragile towards misspeciﬁcation because consistent
estimates of t crucially depend on the correct speciﬁcation of f(Bi) and g(Bi).
To overcome this deﬁciency, Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw [2001] propose a
9non-parametric approach. Assume that both E[aijBi = B] and the conditional mean
function E[eijB] are continuous at B. Assuming further that the treatment effect is
constant across different individuals, the average treatment effect is identiﬁed as the
following ratio:
t =
limB#B E[YijBi = B]   limB"B E[YijBi = B]
limB#B E[MijBi = B]   limB"B E[MijBi = B]
=
Y+  Y 
M+   M . (5)
The limits Y+, Y , M+, and M  can be estimated using one-sided kernel regressions.
The advantage of this approach compared to the two-step estimation procedure sug-
gested by van der Klaauw [2002] is that it does not require the speciﬁcation of f(Bi)
and g(Bi) or indeed the inclusion of any other covariate.8 However, a disadvantage
is that the treatment effect is estimated using only observations near the threshold B
and that non-parametric estimation of the limits requires the choice of a kernel func-
tion and of an appropriate bandwidth. Because of the poor boundary performance of
standard kernel estimators, Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw [2001] propose the use
of local linear regressions suggested by Fan [1992] to estimate the limits.
The denominator in Equation (5) is nonzero because P[Mi = 1jBi = B] is discontin-
uous at B. Our case represents a mixture between the sharp and the fuzzy RD designs




Viewed from this practical perspective, the sharp RD design is essentially a special
case of its fuzzy counterpart where the estimate of the jump around the cutoff for the
outcome variable is not rescaled by the jump in the probability of treatment. [Lee and
Lemieux 2009] More accurately, however, the partially fuzzy design requires only the
same regularity conditions needed for identiﬁcation in a sharp RD design. [Battistin
8Covariates can be included with the aim of reducing sampling variability. Nevertheless, as long
as the assumptions underlying identiﬁcation is fulﬁlled, the RD estimator will be unbiased. [Lee and
Lemieux 2009]
10and Rettore 2008]
One could think of the fuzzy RD estimator as a “local” estimator in two ways.
First, a limitation of the RD approach is that the treatment effect can only be iden-
tiﬁed for persons with values of Bi that are near B. Second, in this neighborhood,
the treatment effect is identiﬁed only for the “compliers” or that sub-group of indi-
viduals for whom the probability of treatment changes discontinuously at B [Imbens
and Lemieux 2008]. Allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects requires the addi-
tional assumption that treatment Mi is independent of t conditional on being near
the threshold B (local conditional independence assumption), i.e., that the potential
costs of or returns to treatment do not change the behavior of individuals in such a
way that they try to inﬂuence the treatment probability.9 Under this assumption, the
ratio deﬁned in Equation (5) identiﬁes a local average treatment effect (LATE) in the
sense proposed by Imbens and Angrist [1994]. As such, the external validity of RD es-
timates is not apparent10 but its internal validity is widely believed to be unparalleled
by other quasi-experimental methods relied upon to draw causal inferences [Imbens
and Wooldridge 2009; Lee and Lemieux 2009].
4 Data Construction and Description
We use process-generated German register data provided by the Institute for Employ-
ment Research (IAB) and generated by an integrated notifying procedure for the pub-
lic health insurance, statutory pension scheme, and unemployment insurance, which
was introduced in 1973. By law, employers have to provide information to the social
security agencies for employees acquiring claims to the social security system. These
9When economic agents can precisely manipulate their behavior at the cutoff point, the RD design
fails to identify any meaningful treatment effect [Lee 2008; Urquiola and Verhoogen 2009]. However, as
long as the manipulation is imprecise, the situation in a small neighborhood around the discontinuity
can still be considered a local random experiment for which the RD approach is well-suited [Lee and
Lemieux 2009].
10Although that is debatable. See, e.g., the discussion in Lee and Lemieux [2009] and their interpre-
tation of the gap at the cutoff point as a “weighted average treatment effect” that is generalizable.
11notiﬁcations are required at the start and end of any employment relationship. In ad-
dition, employers are obliged to provide an annual report for each employee who is
employed on the 31st of December of each year and covered by social insurance. The
reports include information on sex, year of birth, nationality, occupation, qualiﬁcation,
as well as the gross wage rate of the employee. According to the obligation to regis-
ter with the state pension authorities, the data encompass all persons who have paid
contributions to the pension system or who have been covered by the pension system
through contributions by the unemployment insurance. As a consequence, certain
groups of employees (e.g., temporary civil servants or self-employed persons) are not
covered by the data.
We combine the IAB employment sample with additional administrative data as-
sembledatthestatepensionauthorities(IABemploymentsupplementsample; IAB-S).
Both datasets can be linked by the social security number. The matched ﬁle contains
a 1-percent random sample of the total German population that was gainfully em-
ployed for at least one day between 1975 and 1995 (for details, see Bender, Haas and
Klose [2000]).11 Note that the IAB-S is an event-data set, which enables us to obtain
labor-market information on a daily basis.
The IAB-S offers several advantages. First, as opposed to other datasets in Ger-
many, the IAB-S allows identiﬁcation of persons who served in the Bundeswehr. In par-
ticular, we can distinguish between regular employment, unemployment, and other
“non-active” states such as maternity leave, illness, disability, full-time education, and
military service. The dataset also has exact information on the date of birth which al-
lows us to separate persons in the White Cohort from persons who faced a positive
probability of being drafted for military service. Finally, it is large enough to have suf-
ﬁcient observations around the threshold date of July 1, 1937 to meaningfully apply
the RD approach.
11A new version of the IAB-S will be available for researchers via the Research Data Center of the
German Employment Agency in the Institute for Employment Research (RDC-IAB) in 2011. See http:
//fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_Projects/BASID.aspx/.
12From the original sample, we deleted all females, East Germans, and all persons
that lived outside of West Germany at one point in time, including foreigners and eth-
nic German immigrants. We further restricted our analysis to persons born between
January 1, 1934 and December 31, 1940 who worked for at least one day in our sample
period. The latter selection was mainly driven by the desire to capture a symmetric
range of birth cohorts around the threshold year of 1937 and to limit the probability
that a non-negligible fraction of individuals in our sample serves in alternative func-
tions other than military service. Furthermore, individuals in the sample should not
serve more than 12 months. Thus, we are able to concentrate our empirical analysis on
those men who were in the Bundeswehr with the same duration of service. Professional
soldiers and those who started CMS and then decided to become professional soldiers
have also been dropped from our sample.
Figure 1 shows the average number of conscripts by date of birth. The ﬁgure shows
that about 18 percent of the men born in July 1937 have been drafted for military ser-
vice. The share of conscripts is slightly decreasing for men born between July 1937
and August 1938 and is sharply increasing for men born after the middle of 1938.
This development could be explained by temporary frictions in building up the Bun-
deswehr in the initial years and the gradual intensiﬁcation of the Cold War. In addition,
several special exemptions applied in the ﬁrst years of the Bundeswehr. For example,
sole sons of a soldier killed in World War II or a soldier still missing were exempted.
This rule applied to about 10 percent of the men in the birth cohorts from 1937 to
1944 [Wehrstruktur-Kommission 1971]. Those who lost all brothers or all sisters could
also request for an exemption. Additionally, persons who are examined to be ﬁt for
service could defer the draft if they face a personal, economic, or occupational situa-
tion in which the draft would be a serious hardship. This deferment could result in a
permanent exemption when these persons reached the maximum age limit of 25 for
the initiation of military service. According to the Wehrstruktur-Kommission [1971],
about 3.5 percent of all men in a birth cohort received a permanent exemption from
13military service in the 1960s because they were older than 25.
As a composite indicator of labor-market success, we consider the cumulative real
earnings from 1963 to 1988. We also investigate the effect of CMS on the cumulative
days of employment within the same period. Differences in real wages at different
points in the life cycle and cumulative earnings might be the result of differences in
accumulated labor-market experience due to distinct probabilities of becoming unem-
ployed, sick, or leaving the labor market. Therefore, we also analyze the effects of
CMS on lifetime average daily wage, deﬁned as the cumulative earnings divided by
the cumulative days of employment. Finally, we consider the real daily gross wage for
each year in the sample.
Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3 report some descriptive statistics of the variables used
in our analysis. In Table 1, the cumulative lifetime earnings and lifetime average daily
wage of individuals from the White Cohort are less than those born at or after July 1,
1937. For the lifetime average daily wage and educational attainment, the differences
are statistically signiﬁcant. However, this difference disappears when we restrict the
sample to those born in 1937.12 The reported real daily wages at age 30, 40, and 50
show the typical concave pattern over the life cycle that could be observed in almost
all developed countries.
Throughout the life cycle, individuals that served in the military earn more than
both individuals from the White Cohort and individuals born after July 1, 1937 who
were not drafted for military service. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the age–earnings
proﬁles by group for the full sample and the sample of individuals born in 1937, re-
spectively. Those who served in the Bundeswehr earn more than both those who did
not serve and those from the White Cohort. Note that the respective earnings differen-
tials are smaller if we restrict our sample to individuals born in 1937. A similar picture
emerges if we look at lifetime average wages, cumulative days of employment, and
cumulative lifetime earnings, which are depicted in Figures 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c), respec-
12These tests are available upon request.
14tively. The differences between those who served in the military and the rest of the
sample are even starker in these graphs. Draftees seem to enjoy a remarkable advan-
tage over non-draftees. However, these simple comparisons do not inform us about
the causal impact of CMS on labor-market outcomes because of the selection mecha-
nism which we have yet to take into account.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 OLS Results
The estimated returns to military service obtained by OLS regressions are shown in
Figure 4 and Table 2. The estimated coefﬁcients in Figure 4 are obtained from OLS
regressions of (log) real daily gross wage on a dummy variable indicating whether
an individual served in the Bundeswehr, two education dummies13, age, and quarter-
of-birth dummies. These regressions are performed separately for each year in the
sample. The ﬁgure shows that for both sub-samples depicted, the returns to military
service are slightly increasing over time. Using the full sample (Figure 4(a)), the es-
timated returns to military service starts out at almost 1 percent in 1963 and ends at
about 3 percent in 1988. Using only individuals born between 1936 and 1938 provides
a somewhat similar picture (Figure 4(b)) although the standard errors of the estimates
are naturally higher because of the reduced sample size.
Table 2 shows the estimated returns to military service when using lifetime average
daily wage, cumulative days of employment, and cumulative lifetime earnings as de-
pendent variables, with the aforementioned controls present in the regressions. Using
the full sample, the results suggest that over their entire life cycle, those who served in
the Bundeswehr have wages that are about 4.6 percent higher than the wages of those
13We use the term “high school” to refer to indivduals who have successfully completed either an
apprenticeship or the Abitur, the qualiﬁcation exam to enter university. “University” is reserved for
those who earned a degree from a Hochschule (tertiary education), which is not the same as secondary
education referred to by its literal English translation into “high school”. The reference category is
non-completion of an apprenticeship, an Abitur, or a university degree.
15who have been exempted or are born before July 1, 1937 (Panel A, Column (2) of Ta-
ble 2). In terms of the effect of CMS on the number of days of employment (Panel B),
we ﬁnd that those who served in the Bundeswehr work 13 percent more days than their
counterparts who did not enter the armed forces. Taken together, these effects amount
to a cumulative lifetime earnings (Panel C) advantage of about 17 percent. The results
are very similar when restricting the sample to those born in the period 1936–1938.
5.2 RD Results
The estimated returns to military service using OLS are biased due to the non-random
selection of the conscripts described in Section 2. We account for this by presenting RD
estimates in Table 3 and Figure 5. In Table 3, the results for Panel A are based on 2SLS
regressions while the estimates for Panel B come from local linear regressions. For the
2SLS procedure, we use a quartic polynomial of the difference between an individual’s
date of birth and B measured in days and its interaction with a dummy variable which
equals 1 for non-White Cohort observations.14 This appears in both the ﬁrst-stage and
the second-stage regressions (i.e., f(Bi) is equal to g(Bi); see Equations (3) and (4)),
with the indicator variable serving as the lone excluded instrument. Alternatively,
both f(Bi) and g(Bi) are modelled as cubic splines (piecewise cubic polynomials) to
more ﬂexibly account for non-linearities. Quarter-of-birth and level-of-education con-
trols further serve as included instruments. The point estimates indicate that those
who served in the Bundeswehr have a cumulative lifetime earnings disadvantage of
about 2 to 8 percent. However, this is mostly driven by the reduction in the days of
employment (as high as 16 percent based on the polynomial regressions) since the
lifetime average daily wage actually increases (Columns (1) and (2)). However, these
returns are imprecisely estimated.
14Weproceed toestimate thesystem using2SLS despitethe binarynature ofthe endogenousvariable
since consistent estimation of the parameter of interest in the second stage is unaffected by a linear
approximation of the conditional expectation function in the ﬁrst stage [Heckman 1978; Angrist and
Krueger 1994]. However, the standard errors are clustered at the day of birth to allow for an arbitrary
correlation structure within each cohort [Lee and Card 2008].
16Local linear estimates are presented in Figure 5 and Panel B of Table 3. The limits
Y+, Y , and M+ described in Equation (6) are estimated using local linear regressions
around the point of discontinuity. In Figure 5, we graphically represent the difference
between Y+ and Y . From the conﬁdence-interval bands, one can see that there is no
statistical difference between the estimates on both sides of the threshold.15 However,
the point estimates at the cutoff give an indication of the direction of the causal impact
of CMS on labor-market outcomes which are consistent with the 2SLS estimates.
In Panel B of Table 3, we report estimates based on two different kernels (triangu-
lar and rectangular) and three different bandwidth choices. The preferred bandwidth
is derived through a “rule of thumb” (see StataCorp [2007] for details); we then re-
estimate the model with the preferred bandwidth reduced by 50 percent and then
again increased by 50 percent. The direction of the estimates from the parametric
regressions in Panel A carry over to the non-parametric setup in Panel B. The impreci-
sion over the estimates is also sustained. One reason for the inﬂated standard errors is
the drastic reduction in the sample size over which the estimates are computed. This
can be seen more clearly when one compares the standard errors obtained from dif-
ferent bandwidths. The smallest window (50 percent of the preferred bandwidth) has
the highest standard errors across the board. As the imprecision over the estimates is
driven by the methodology itself, we would like to think of this set of non-parametric
estimates as primarily a robustness check on the polynomial- and spline-based esti-
mates presented in Panel A. Thus, in terms of the direction of the causal effect of CMS
on labor-market outcomes, the parametric estimates using the whole sample are con-
ﬁrmed by the local linear regression results.
15The graphs are constructed using the triangular kernel. The graphs based on the rectangular kernel
look similar and are available from the authors.
175.3 Validity of the RD Design
The validity of the RD approach largely rests on the assumption that individuals near
thethresholdvalue B aresimilarwithregardtotheirobservedandunobservedcharac-
teristics. If this assumption were true, an implication is that the distribution of covari-
ates that are presumably not affected by the forcing variable Bi should be continuous
at B. This is similar in spirit to placebo regressions that are now commonly done in the
evaluation literature. Unfortunately, the IAB-S provides only limited information on
those characteristics of the individuals which are determined before a potential draft
(i.e., the traits unaffected by military service). The only variable which largely satisﬁes
these requirements is educational attainment. For most men, pre-university schooling
is already completed at the time of their draft. However, for those planning to grad-
uate from university, the draft usually occurs between the completion of high school
and the start of university education. For these men, the draft defers university educa-
tion but does not necessarily affect the decision to obtain a university degree.16 In our
case, we see this most obviously in Figure 6(a), where the share of men who completed
the qualiﬁcation exam to enter university is rendered over the running variable.
Another piece of evidence to support the RD approach is the continuous distri-
bution (over the threshold) of other covariates that could affect the outcome vari-
ables used in the analysis. If these variables are continuous at the critical point, then
the change in the outcome variable could entirely be attributed to the treatment. In
Figure 6(b), we observe that there is a slight discontinuity in the share of men who
completed a university degree but the difference is small and also well-within the 95-
percent conﬁdence intervals. Taken together, the behavior of the other covariates over
the forcing variable lead credence to the RD approach taken here.
16Those persons who are categorized to be ﬁt for service and start their university education before
being drafted could apply for a temporary exemption from military service until they receive their
universitydegree. Accordingtothelaw, however, theyhavetoexpecttobedraftedbeforethemaximum
age limit of 25, irrespective of whether they ﬁnished their degree. Hence, there are strong incentives
to enter military service before starting university education. The law further limits the possibilities to
decide to go to university just to avoid the draft to military service.
18Finally, we test for possible discontinuities in the sample where there should be no
discontinuity. To implement this test, we split the sample into non-White Cohort and
White Cohort observations. For each of the sub-samples, we take the median of the
forcing variable and simulate a discontinuity at this value of B. Then, we estimate the
impact of this simulated discontinuity on the outcome variables. We expect that there
should be no signiﬁcant effect on labor-market outcomes (i.e., that there should be no
discontinuity in Y) since, in reality, there was no treatment at this point. Indeed, these
placebo regressions indicate that there are no unexpected discontinuities that could
put into question the RD design.17
5.4 Alternative IV Results
As noted above, the RD design identiﬁes a LATE that may not be generalizable to
birth cohorts other than those around the threshold date. We therefore present alter-
native IV results with which to compare the RD estimates. Here, we follow Imbens
and van der Klaauw [1995] by using variations in the average conscription rate by
month of birth as an instrument for serving in the Bundeswehr. The probability to be
drafted depends, among other things, on the size of the birth cohort. With a relatively
constant demand for conscripts, the Bundeswehr tacitly tightens its requirements for
enlistment in the case of a large birth cohort while it loosens these same requirements
when a birth cohort yields less potential draftees. The control variables are the same
as the ones used for the OLS estimates discussed in Section 5.1. While the RD esti-
mates are local in two dimensions (they identify the treatment effect for the compliers
around the neighborhood of the discontinuity), the IV estimates presented here are
local only in the sense that they identify the treatment effect for the compliers. We ﬁnd
that the estimates are not substantially different from the ones obtained using the RD
approach.
The results from these IV estimations are reported in Table 4 and Figure 7. In Ta-
17These tests are available upon request.
19ble 4, the returns to military service in terms of the lifetime average daily wage are
positive and higher than the corresponding OLS estimates in Table 2. However, be-
cause of the reduction in the cumulative days of employment, the resulting estimates
for the effect on cumulative lifetime earnings are less than the OLS estimates. In Fig-
ures 7(a) and 7(b), the IV estimates of the impact of CMS on the (log) real daily gross
wage show roughly the same evolution as Figures 4(a) and 4(b). Nevertheless, these
point estimates do not statistically differ from 0. Ultimately, accounting for the se-
lection effects during the draft through the use of an instrumental variable produces
insigniﬁcant estimates of the returns to CMS.
6 Conclusion
The costs and beneﬁts of serving in the military for the conscripts themselves have not
been thoroughly examined in Germany. This issue is particularly relevant as policy-
makers are considering a shift from a system of conscription to that of voluntary en-
listment. A proponent of maintaining conscription may point to the fact that, in terms
of wages, employment, and lifetime earnings, men who served in the Bundeswehr end
up performing better than those who did not serve. That is, the costs—if any—of per-
forming military service are outweighed by its beneﬁts. Such beneﬁts may be due to
the transfer of valued skills learned in the armed forces to the civilian labor market or
outright preferential treatment for draftees. However, such a comparison would fail
to take into account the manner in which these men were selected into the Bundeswehr.
When we correct for the selection bias, we ﬁnd that CMS has no long-run impact on
the labor-market performance of conscripts. Therefore, the observed earnings differ-
ential between conscripts and non-conscripts could entirely be attributed to the way
the former were selected into the armed forces. Consider the likely case wherein these
men are healthier than their rejected or exempted counterparts. To the extent that
a better health status contributes to a better labor-market outcome, it would be rea-
20sonable to say that conscripts would have earned more even without serving in the
Bundeswehr. We conclude that the observed differences between those who served
and those who did not serve cannot be attributed to military service.
***
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Age in 1988 53.1880 49.6762 49.3060 49.7553
[1.0157] [0.9927] [0.9681] [0.9799]
No Educational Degree* 0.2799 0.2446 0.1701 0.2605
[0.4490] [0.4298] [0.3758] [0.4389]
Completed Apprenticeship* 0.6584 0.6791 0.7939 0.6545
[0.4743] [0.4669] [0.4046] [0.4756]
Passed Abitur* 0.0616 0.0764 0.0360 0.0850
[0.2405] [0.2656] [0.1863] [0.2789]
University Degree* 0.0513 0.0636 0.0294 0.0709
[0.2205] [0.2441] [0.1689] [0.2567]
(log) Cumulative Lifetime Earnings, 1963–1988 13.6600 13.6663 13.8285 13.6316
[0.8840] [0.7972] [0.5155] [0.8413]
(log) Lifetime Average Daily Wage, 1963–1988 4.8011 4.8218 4.8716 4.8112
[0.2822] [0.2740] [0.2246] [0.2823]
(log) Cumulative Days of Employment, 1963–1988 8.8589 8.8444 8.9569 8.8204
[0.7323] [0.6454] [0.3889] [0.6856]
(log) Real Daily Wage at Age 30† 4.3795 4.5840 4.6433 4.5706
[0.2809] [0.2905] [0.2489] [0.2975]
(log) Real Daily Wage at Age 40† 4.8695 4.9818 5.0190 4.9735
[0.2828] [0.2859] [0.2363] [0.2952]
(log) Real Daily Wage at Age 50† 5.0389 5.1060 5.1390 5.1011
[0.3271] [0.3363] [0.2764] [0.3441]
Observations 10,027 11,981 2,111 9,870
NOTES: * indicates an dummy variable. Standard deviations are in brackets. † Since the dataset is not a balanced panel, the
number of observations used to compute these summary statistics do not correspond with the last row of the table.
25TABLE 2 —OLS ESTIMATES OF THE RETURNS TO CMS
Full Sample Cohort 1936–1938
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: (log) Lifetime Average Daily Wage
Military Service 0.0655*** 0.0466*** 0.0492*** 0.0461***
[0.0052] [0.0053] [0.0099] [0.0097]
High School — 0.1925*** — 0.1945***
[0.0042] [0.0064]
University — 0.3998*** — 0.4056***
[0.0083] [0.0127]
Panel B: (log) Cumulative Days of Employment
Military Service 0.1171*** 0.1269*** 0.1388*** 0.1175***
[0.0098] [0.0107] [0.0196] [0.0208]
High School — 0.2436*** — 0.2490***
[0.0130] [0.0217]
University — 0.1531*** — 0.1686***
[0.0226] [0.0343]
Panel C: (log) Cumulative Lifetime Earnings
Military Service 0.1826*** 0.1735*** 0.1880*** 0.1636***
[0.0127] [0.0136] [0.0251] [0.0261]
High School — 0.4357*** — 0.4436***
[0.0152] [0.0235]
University — 0.5529*** — 0.5742***
[0.0279] [0.0423]
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 22,008 9,322
NOTES: Wage and earnings are in 1995 DM. Bracketed numbers are robust
standard errors clustered at the day of birth. See text for the list of other con-
trol variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
26TABLE 3 —RD ESTIMATES OF THE RETURNS TO CMS
(log) Lifetime (log) Cumulative Days (log) Cumulative
Average Daily Wage of Employment Lifetime Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Global Polynomial- and Spline-Based 2SLS Estimates
Military Service 0.0849 0.0335  0.1607  0.0530  0.0759  0.0195
[0.1271] [0.0964] [0.3188] [0.2456] [0.3900] [0.2986]
F-statistic 34.44 271.27 34.44 271.27 34.44 271.27
Partial R2 0.0027 0.0045 0.0027 0.0045 0.0027 0.0045
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,008 22,008 22,008
Panel B: Local Linear Regressions
(i) Preferred Bandwidth
Military Service 0.1021 0.0955  0.3590  0.3118  0.2366  0.3066
[0.2155] [0.2177] [0.5324] [0.5471] [0.6174] [0.7040]
(ii) 50 Percent of Preferred Bandwidth
Military Service 0.1581 0.1361  0.5602  0.7108  0.3125  0.9397
[0.4943] [0.7165] [1.4168] [7.6684] [1.8303] [10.7459]
(iii) 150 Percent of Preferred Bandwidth
Military Service 0.1251 0.1353  0.2957  0.3311  0.1087  0.0553
[0.1651] [0.1710] [0.4032] [0.4507] [0.4581] [0.5455]
NOTES: In Panel A, odd columns report estimates using polynomials; even columns report spline-based estimates.
In Panel B, odd columns report estimates based on the triangular kernel; even columns report estimates based on
the rectangular kernel. Wage and earnings are in 1995 DM. Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors clustered
at the day of birth for Panel A and bootstrapped using 500 replications for Panel B. The F-statistic and partial R2
are from the ﬁrst-stage regressions. See text for the list of control variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
27TABLE 4 —ALTERNATIVE IV ESTIMATES OF THE RETURNS TO CMS
(log) Lifetime (log) Cumulative Days (log) Cumulative
Average Daily Wage of Employment Lifetime Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Military Service 0.0912 0.0646  0.0348  0.0537 0.0565 0.0109
[0.0612] [0.0790] [0.1516] [0.2051] [0.1866] [0.2519]
High School 0.1902*** 0.1941*** 0.2506*** 0.2534*** 0.4408*** 0.4475***
[0.0050] [0.0068] [0.0146] [0.0211] [0.0173] [0.0247]
University 0.2109*** 0.2120***  0.1025***  0.0888*** 0.1085*** 0.1232***
[0.0089] [0.0126] [0.0221] [0.0311] [0.0279] [0.0393]
F-statistic 357.88 67.28 357.88 67.28 357.88 67.28
Partial R2 0.0103 0.0234 0.0103 0.0234 0.0103 0.0234
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,008 9,322 22,008 9,322 22,008 9,322
NOTES: Odd columns use the full sample; even columns use Birth Cohort 1936–1938. Wage and earnings are in 1995 DM.
Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors clustered at the day of birth. See text for the list of other control variables.
The F-statistic and partial R2 are from the ﬁrst-stage regressions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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NOTE: Lowess curves are plotted over observations from each sub-group.
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(c) Cumulative Lifetime Earnings
NOTE: Local linear ﬁts are surrounded by shaded areas that represent the 95-percent conﬁdence intervals.
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NOTE: Local linear ﬁts are surrounded by shaded areas that represent the 95-percent conﬁdence intervals.
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NOTES: Dashed lines encompass the 95-percent conﬁdence interval. Instruments are average conscription rate by month of
birth.
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